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Abstract
Domulti-level selection explanations of the evolutionof social traits deepen
the understanding provided by single-level explanations? Central tomulti-
level explanations is a mathematical theorem, the multi-level Price decom-
position. I build a framework through which to understand the explana-
tory role of such non-empirical decompositions in scientiđc practice. Ap-
plying this general framework to the present case places two tasks on the
agenda. ăeđrst task is to distinguish the variousways bywhich onemight
suppresswithin-collective variation inđtness, or indeedbetween-collective
variation in đtness. I distinguish đve such ways: increasing retaliatory ca-
pacity; homogenising assortment; collapsing eitherđtness structure or char-
acter distribution to a mean value; and boosting đtness uniformly within
collectives. I then evaluate the biological interest of each of these hypo-
thetical interventions. ăe second task is to discover whether one of the
right-hand terms of the Price decomposition measures the effect of any of
these interventions. On this basis I argue that themulti-level Price decom-
position has explanatory value primarily when the sharing-out of collec-
tive resources is ‘subtractable’. ăus its value is more circumscribed than its
champions Sober andWilson ([1998]) suppose.
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1 Single-Level andMulti-Level Selection
One of the key variables in evolutionary theory is character–đtness covariance;
the degree to which those organisms that possess a given character are statisti-
cally more likely to be đtter than those organisms that don’t possess the charac-
ter. Take for example a lion’s inclination to hunt socially rather than on its own.
Suppose that the đtness of each lion in a population is given by Table 1. So it’s
determined by whether or not that lion has this inclination to hunt socially, and
by whether or not the lions that it interacts with have this inclination. Making
some simple assumptions one can calculate that the covariance between char-
acter and đtness in this case is f0(1   f0)(4f0   1); where f0 is the proportion
of the lion population who are presently social hunters.1 Consider the case in
which the population is evenly divided at present between social hunters and
lone hunters; in other words f0 = 12 . In these circumstances it follows that there
is a positive covariance between social hunting and đtness, namely of 1
4
. ăis
fact about covariance is key because it can provide a simple explanation of why
the frequency of social hunters increased from the present generation of lions to
the next generation. Explanation: lions inclined to hunt socially were—in the
circumstances above—more likely to be đtter and this caused such lions to have
relatively more offspring, most of whom inherited this inclination. And so the
frequency of social hunters increased.
who interacts with who interacts with
social hunters lone hunters
Fitness of social hunter 4 0
Fitness of lone hunter 1 1
Table 1: Example Fitness Matrix
For reasons that will soon become clear I will call such explanations ‘single-
level selection’ explanations. Such explanations are underwritten by the Robert-
son–Price identity. ăis equation describes how the covariance of character and
1Assume that lions form pairs of lions completely at random.
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đtness determines the increasedprevalence of a character in apopulation (Robert-
son [1966]; Price [1970]). ăis equation follows deductively from some com-
mon simplifying assumptions: that there is no migration into or out of the pop-
ulation; that the character in question is heritable and inherited without ‘trans-
mission bias’; and that there are no stochastic effects at work (Price [1972];
Sober [1984]; Okasha [2006]). In the wake of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species
single-level selection explanations have become so commonplace in evolutionary
biology as to be unremarkable:
It would be advantageous to the Melipona [bee], if she were to make her
cells closer together, and more regular in every way than at present; for
then, as we have seen, the spherical surfaces would wholly disappear, and
would all be replaced by plane surfaces; and the Melipona would make a
comb as perfect as that of the hive-bee. : : : ăus, as I believe, the most
wonderful of all known instincts, that of the hive-bee, can be explained by
natural selection : : : (Darwin [1859], pp. 174–75)
Moving from explanations of concrete biological cases over to abstractmath-
ematical models, this ‘single-level’ emphasis upon character–đtness covariance
remains commonplace.2 For example in textbook treatments of evolutionary
theory one sees đtness matrices (such as Table 1) being used to identify the cir-
cumstances under which this character–đtness covariance will be positive, neg-
ative or zero (McElreath and Boyd [2007], p. 203). In the lion hunting case,
for example, this depends upon the initial frequency f0 of social hunters in the
population. Indeed one could describe the search in evolutionary game theory
for so-called evolutionary stable states or strategies roughly as the search for the
conditions under which character–đtness covariance is zero: f0 = 0, or 14 , or 1
in this example.3
ăis illustrates how the covariance of character with đtness across the whole
population is a central explanatory variable. Now in its multi-level form4 the so-
called Price equation decomposes this central variable into the sum of two other
variables (Okasha [2006]). To put it brieĔy, one of these variables is supposed
to relate in some sense to ‘selection at the level of individual lions’ and the other
to ‘selection at the level of groups of lions’. I will say much more about these
two variables in Section 3. For now it will suffice to say that both these variables
2McElreath and Boyd ([2007], x5.1) call the use of single-level explanations the ‘personal
đtness approach’ to evolution.
3Note that this is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a distribution of characters
across a population to constitute an evolutionarily stable distribution.
4ăe multi-level Price equation is a variation of the Price equation (Price [1972]), which
itself is a more general form of the Robertson–Price identity (Robertson [1966]; Price [1970]).
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are statistical functions of the distribution of character and đtness among lion
groups.
Consider for example those cases in which selection for social hunting at the
level of lion groups outweighed selection against social hunting at the level of in-
dividual lions. (Again, muchmore on this in Section 3.) In such cases themulti-
level Price decomposition suggests a controversial explanation for the increase
in the prevalence of social hunters from one generation to the next: group-level
selection for social hunting outweighed individual-level selection against social
hunting. As a consequence explanations that employ these two variables from
themulti-level Price decomposition are oĕen called ‘multi-level selection’ expla-
nations.
ăe main focus of this paper will be the contrast between multi-level se-
lection explanations and single-level selection explanations. And this will leave
no time to say anything about the explanations afforded by selđsh-gene theory
(Dawkins [1976], [1982]) or inclusive đtness theory (Hamilton [1964]; Frank
[1998]). Moreover considerations of space preventme fromdiscussing the alter-
native form of multi-level selection theory based on contextual analysis (Heisler
and Damuth [1987]; Goodnight et al. [1992]) rather than the multi-level Price
decomposition.
In contrasting the multi-level explanatory framework with the single-level
framework I do not mean to imply that these frameworks offer competing ex-
planations. As I deđne the concept, two explanations of the same case compete
exactly when it is highly implausible, if not impossible, that they both be correct.
Take for instance the explanation that the CIA shot Kennedy, and the explana-
tion that Soviet agents shot Kennedy. In fact I’m happy to accept the so-called
pluralist idea that multi-level explanations and single-level explanations—and
for that matter selđsh-gene and inclusive-đtness explanations—oĕen posit the
sameprocess (Kerr andGodfrey-Smith [2002]) and so each framework canplau-
sibly provide a correct explanation of the same case.
Instead, by contrastingmulti-level explanationswith single-level explanations,
what I aim to do is to address the issue of explanatory depth. For example an
explanation of why a car accelerated that speciđes the car’s mechanics or the psy-
chology of its driver provides a deeper explanation than merely citing the fact
that the accelerator pedal was pressed. ăis shows how an explanation can be
deeper than another without competing with it. On the one hand Sober and
Wilson ([1998]) think that explanations of the evolution of social characters
that employ the multi-level Price decomposition are deeper than single-level ex-
planations. But on the other hand there are those who disagree. Maynard-Smith
disagrees because he đndsmulti-level explanations altogether dubious;5 whereas
5See Okasha ([2005], pp. 1000, 1004) for references and discussion of the complexities of
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Dugatkin and Reeve ([1994], pp. 121, 124) disagree because they think multi-
level explanations are fully equivalent to single-level explanations.6
ăe distinctive strategy of this paper will be to separate this issue of explana-
tory depth from the other issues in the ‘levels of selection’ literaturewithwhich it
is entangled. In addressing it I will draw instead upon the general philosophical
literature on explanation. ăus I will not discuss what it means for selection to
‘act at a particular level’ such as that of the group (Lloyd [1986], [2000]; Okasha
[2006]), norwhat it takes for something such as a group of organisms to count as
a ‘biological individual’ (Clarke [Forthcoming]), nor whether groups can be ve-
hicles inDawkin’s ([1982]) sense, or interactors inHull’s ([1981]) sense. Indeed
one could perhaps think that there is no fact of thematter about such questions,7
questions concerning vehicles or interactors say, but still think that there is a fact
of the matter about the topic of this paper, namely the depth of the multi-level
selection framework.
ăis focus on the explanatory depth of the multi-level Price decomposition
will also raise wider philosophical questions. For the decomposition is a math-
ematical theorem: it’s truth isn’t contingent on what the world happens to be
like; and one doesn’t need any scientiđc evidence to know that it’s true. Con-
sequently one might wonder how such ‘non-empirical’ propositions could play
a genuine role in scientiđc explanation (Pincock [2007]; Baker [2009]; Batter-
man [2010]). As Lange and Rosenberg ([2011], p. 593) point out in response
to Sober ([2011]), it is ‘difficult to see how [propositions in evolutionary theory
that are knowable a priori] could đgure in causal explanations’.
So I will look beyond the philosophy of biology literature to explore how
non-empirical decompositions such as the multi-level Price theorem can play an
explanatory role. ăe suggestion will be—to put it somewhat laconically—that
such decompositions highlight those constitutive relationships that help glue
different factors in our explanatory reasoning together. Applying this sugges-
tion to the multi-level Price decomposition shows that this decomposition has
explanatory value, I will argue, primarily in cases in which the sharing-out of re-
sources is ‘subtractable’. ăus the range of cases across which the decomposition
provides deep explanations is more modest than its champions suppose.
Maynard Smith’s views.
6ăings are not quite as clear cut as this. See Dugatkin and Reeve ([1994], p. 123). What is
clear is thatmuch confusion has been generated in contrastingmulti-level selection explanations
with their ‘individualist’ rivals, but not making clear what rivals one has in mind.
7See Sterelny ([1996]), Okasha ([2004a]), and Sarkar ([2008]) for discussion of this sort of
pluralism.
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2 ăree Conditions on Explanatory Decompositions
What does one need to know in order to explain a phenomenon? In the philo-
sophical literature a very popular suggestion is that one needs to know what
would happen under certain ‘hypothetical alterations’ to the system in question.
Would the phenomenon still have occurred if certain things had gone differ-
ently (Lewis [1986];Woodward [2003])?8 To explain why the economy shrank
in 2008 for example it helps to know that the size of the economy would have
been greater if banks had been more tightly regulated. So I am going to follow
Lewis andWoodward in assuming that to explain is to answer important what-
if-things-had-been-different questions. Accordingly the depth of an explanation
is in proportion, roughly speaking, to the number of what-if questions it allows
one to answer concerning important hypothetical alterations to the system in
question. ăis measure of explanatory depth is by no means uncontroversial,
but I will wait until Section 8 to examine it in further detail.
One qualiđcation: to explain why the economy shrank it does not help to
know that the size of the economy would have been greater if extra-terrestrials
had landed from outer space and donated a billion barrels of oil to the treasury.
ăewhat-if question about bank regulation is therefore different to the question
about extra-terrestrial oil donation in that answering the former has explanatory
value, but answering the latter does not. I will assume that the standard account
of such differences is correct: we just happen to be more interested in hypo-
thetical alterations to bank regulation than in far-fetched questions about extra-
terrestrial oil donations.9 ăeimportance of a hypothetical alterationdepends in
this respect upon our personal interests; and thereby so does explanatory depth
according to my measure.10 (Accordingly, the notion of what is interesting to
biologists will play a central role later in this paper.)
I will now use the Lewis–Woodward approach to explanation in order to
build a toy model of how a non-empirical decomposition can play a modest role
in explanation. Consider the following decomposition: the number of guests
booked into a hotel is equal to the number of guests who are on holiday to ski
plus the number of guests who are not on holiday to ski. ăis decomposition
is non-empirical, guaranteed by the logical truth that everyone is either a skier
or a non-skier. Compare this decomposition for example to a second decom-
position, a decomposition of the guests into those guests with blond hair and
8Lewis ([1986]) doesn’t put it in quite these terms. He says that to explain is to cite a cause;
but for Lewis to cite a cause is just to say what could have gone differently such that the phe-
nomenon wouldn’t have occurred.
9But see Hart and Honore ([1965]) for an alternative account.
10For an account that emphasises interests but notwhat-if questions see vanFraassen ([1977])
and Achinstein ([1983]).
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whose name begin with a ‘K’, on the one hand, and those guests who don’t have
both attributes on the other hand. ăe question I want to ask is this: when will
a non-empirical decomposition (for example the đrst decomposition) be more
explanatorily valuable than any of the inđnitely many other non-empirical de-
compositions that one might think of (such as the second decomposition)? To
explore this question let us consider how the đrst decomposition đts into the
following story.
(1) ăis winter has been unusually warm and so the average depth of snow
on the Brixental ski slopes has been half a meter, in contrast to last winter’s three
meters. As a result (2a) there are two hundred skiers booked into the Brixental
hotel, in contrast to last winter’s nine hundred. (2b) And, like last year, there
were one hundred non-skiers also booked into the Brixental hotel. Most of these
non-skiers were there for the annual Wittgenstein conference. So applying our
decomposition to (2a) and (2b) we see can see that (2) the hotel has had under
đve hundred guests rather than over đve hundred as they did last winter. As a
result the hotel has gone bankrupt.
Note that the low number of guests (factor 2) on its own provides a simple
explanation of the bankruptcy. And this explanation is made deeper by adding
the point about the lack of snow (factor 1). But to have a really satisfying expla-
nation of the bankruptcy one needs also to be able to answer what-if questions
of the following form: (Z) what if xmeters of snow had fallen, and other factors
like theWittgenstein conference been arranged in such-and-such a way?11
To answer such what-if questions one will typically reason as follows. ‘In
this hypothetical what-if scenario there would be ga skiing guests on account
of the snow; and there would be gb non-skiing guests on account of the other
factors such as the Wittgenstein conference. According to our decomposition
this constitutes there being g guests in total. ăere would therefore be under đve
hundred guests, and so the hotel would be bankrupt. Alternatively: there would
be over đve hundred guests, and so the hotel would not be bankrupt.’
Let’s be fully explicit about how this works. To know our decomposition is
to know a constitutive relationship X : g is constituted by ga and gb. And know-
ing this constitutive decomposition X is in practice how we come to know the
following causal determination relationshipsY : an interesting đrst factor (snow-
fall) combines with other factors (such as theWittgenstein conference) to deter-
mine a second factor (total guests) which in turn determines the to-be-explained
phenomenon (bankruptcy). And knowing these causal determination relation-
shipsY in turn allowsus to answer some importantwhat-if questionsZ.ăus this
knowledge deepens our simple ‘undecomposed’ explanation (of the bankruptcy
in terms of the total number of guests alone). In short our decomposition high-
11Arranged, for example, such that there were gb non-skiing guests.
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lights a constitutive relationship that helps us to glue together the relevant factors
in our explanatory reasoning.
In principle, of course, one could know these causal determination relation-
ships Y without knowing the constitutive decomposition X. So the explanatory
role of our decomposition is what one might call an ‘ancillary’ one. It is dispens-
able in principle, but not in practice.
It will be important for later to abstract three crucial aspects from this toy
example concerning the guests at the Brixental hotel.
Independence aspect: the value of a term on the right-hand of the decomposi-
tion (gb non-skiing guests) is independent of the đrst factor (snowfall). In other
words its value is preserved by some hypothetical alteration to that đrst factor
(eliminating snowfall). Observe that this aspect of the Brixental case is crucial
in that, without it, knowledge of the constitutive relationship X would be of
no real help in calculating the causal dependencies Y. Later on, I will repeatedly
draw upon the observation that this independence aspect of the Brixental case is
equivalent to the following condition. Independence aspect (alternate render-
ing): the effect upon the value of the leĕ hand term (g total guests) of this alter-
ation (eliminating snowfall) is measured by the attendant change to the value of
a right-hand term in the decomposition (ga skiing guests). Aĕer all, the other
right-hand term (gb) is a residual term that measures the effect of other factors
only (such as theWittgenstein conference).
Interestingness aspect: this hypothetical alteration (eliminating snowfall) is
interesting. ăis aspect of the Brixental case is crucial in that, without it, the
what-if question Z would not be an important one. Hence answering this ques-
tion would be of no explanatory value according to the Lewis–Woodward thesis
about explanation; just as in my extraterrestrial oil donation example.
Knowledge aspect: one knows how the value of the leĕ-hand term (g total
guests) determines the to-be-explained phenomenon (bankruptcy) in the cir-
cumstances. ăis aspect of the Brixental case is crucial in that, without it, one
could not use causal decomposition X to answer what-if question Z.
My conclusion is this: the Lewis–Woodward approach to explanation issues
in three criteria that are in general individually necessary and jointly sufficient
for a non-empirical decomposition to provide explanatory value in the above
manner. ăat is, to issue in an explanation of greater depth than an explanation
(of the bankruptcy) in terms of only the leĕ-hand term of a decomposition (the
total number of guests).
I note in passing that the decomposition involving guests with blonde hair
and names beginning with ‘K’ would in normal circumstances fail both the in-
dependence criterion and the interestingness criterion. Some non-empirical de-
compositions are evidently more explanatorily valuable than others.
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I emphasise that the above are criteria only for the explanatory value of non-
empirical decompositions, not empirical ones. To extend them to the case of
empirical decompositions would be mistaken. For example the ideal gas law
ln(P ) = ln(V ) + ln(T ) has clear explanatory value. But it fails my independence
criterion: when a gas is heated in an expandable chamber both the value of the
ln(V ) term and of the ln(T ) term are altered as a result. So my đrst criterion is
not necessary as regards the explanatory depth of empirical decompositions, as
opposed to non-empirical ones. Conversely the length of Edward Heath’s pre-
miership is equal to the length of Romano Prodi’s premiership plus the length of
John F. Kennedy’s. ăis equation may well meet all my criteria, but it is too ac-
cidental to have any explanatory value.12 Somy three criteria are also not jointly
sufficient as regards the explanatory value of empirical decompositions, as op-
posed to non-empirical ones.
At any rate the explanatory role played by the toy decomposition involving
hotel guests, I will suggest, is the same explanatory role that many non-empirical
decompositions play in the actual practice of science; inparticular themulti-level
Price decomposition in evolutionary biology.
3 ăeMulti-Level Price Decomposition
To spell out themulti-level Price decomposition letme introduce some standard
formalism. Consider a population of individuals, be it a population of genes,
cells, organisms or social groups; although the most intuitive case is when one
takes individuals to be individual organisms. Take an arbitrary individual i. Let
!i denote that individual’s (relative) đtness.13 Let zi denote the degree to which
individual i possesses a particular character in which one is interested. ăis char-
acter of interest will conventionally be a ‘pro-social’ character such as a lion’s be-
ing inclined to hunt cooperatively or a vampire bat’s being inclined to donate
blood to other vampire bats who are in need. ăe multi-level Price decomposi-
tion states that:14
Cov(!; z) = Cov[Expg(!); Expg(z)] + Exp[Covg(!; z)] (1)
What do these three terms mean? ăe leĕ-hand term Cov(!; z) denotes the
covariance of character with đtness across the whole population: to what extent
do individuals who score high on character z tend statistically to be đtter than
12It certainly isn’t invariant under interventions (Woodward [2003]). In contrast note that
non-empirical decompositions are by deđnition maximally invariant under interventions.
13Relative đtness is deđned to be an individual’s absolute đtness divided by the mean đtness
of all individuals in the population. I shall henceforth use ‘đtness’ to mean relative đtness.
14See Price ([1972]) andHamilton ([1975]) for a seminal formulation. SeeOkasha ([2006])
for a very clear commentary.
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individuals in the populationwho score lowon z? For example are grouphunters
đtter on average than other lions?
Now imagine that our population of individuals is partitioned into collec-
tives; so each individual is a member of exactly one collective. (I will leave it
entirely open what it is for an individual to be a member of a collective.) So
Covg(!; z) denotes the covariance of character with đtness within collective g,
rather than across the whole population: to what extent do individuals in collec-
tive g who score high on character z tend statistically to be đtter than those in
the same collective who score low on character z? ăus the third term of the de-
composition Exp[Covg(!; z)] is an average of this measure across the whole pop-
ulation: on average do group hunters tend statistically to be đtter than those in
the same collective who hunt alone?
Finally the second term. Expg(!) is the average đtness of the members of
collective g. Let’s call this the collective’s đtness. Similarly Expg(z) is the average
character of themembers of collective g. Let’s call this the collective’s character.15
So the second termof themulti-level Price decompositionCov[Expg(!); Expg(z)]
is the covariance between these two variables: to what extent do collectives who
score high on character z tend statistically to be đtter than collectives who score
low on character z?16 Putting this less technically and more intuitively: the sec-
ond term of the decomposition measures the association between collectives of
(collective) đtness with (collective) character, whereas the third term measures
the association of (individual) đtness with (individual) character within collec-
tives. Importantly the multi-level Price decomposition is a mathematical theo-
rem, guaranteed by the logic of covariance and of expectation.
It is worth noting at this point that my third criterion for a mathematical
decomposition to have explanatory value—the knowledge criterion—just re-
quires that we know how the value of the leĕ-hand term determines our to-be-
explained phenomenon in the circumstances. And one does in this case. For one
knows the Robertson–Price identity discussed in Section 1, which formally un-
derwrites the intuition that the đtter character z is, so to speak, the more it will
increase in frequency. So one knows how the value of the leĕ-hand term (the
degree of character–đtness covariance in the whole population) determines our
to-be-explained phenomenon, the evolution of character z. So the knowledge
criterion is satisđed. Consequently, this paper will focus on the circumstances
under which themulti-level Price decomposition satisđes the independence and
the interestingness criteria.
15ăus I am focusing on what Damuth and Heisler ([1988]) call multi-level selection type
one, rather than type two.
16Strictly speaking the summation Cov[] is over individuals in the population not collectives.
So strictly speaking: to what extent do individuals that are part of collectives who score high on
character z tend to be members of đt collectives?
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4 ăe Biological Interest Problem for Sober andWilson
One suggested explanatory role for the multi-level Price decomposition empha-
sises the factor of within-collective variation (Sober and Wilson [1998]). And
by this I strongly suspect that Sober andWilson mean variation in đtness rather
than variation in character.17 Sober and Wilson’s key claim is that the third
termof the decompositionmeasures the effect ofwithin-collective variation (pp.
32–33, 73–75). (Sober andWilson also claim that the second termof themulti-
level Price decomposition measures the effect of between-collective variation. I
will set the examination of this claim aside until Section 7.)
ăe general framework developed in Section 2 shows why Sober and Wil-
son’s key claim bears upon the explanatory value of the multi-level Price decom-
position. For this key claim is more or less an application of my independence
criterion for explanatory value. Imagine eliminating within-collective variation
in đtness. Let  denote the attendant effect upon character–đtness covariance
across the whole population; that is, the effect on the value of the leĕ-hand term
of the multi-level Price decomposition. Independence criterion (the alternate
rendering): this effect  is measured by the attendant change in the value of a
right-hand term in the decomposition; for example the third term. So Sober
andWilson’s key claim is more or less an application of the đrst of my three cri-
teria for the multi-level Price decomposition to have explanatory value. Unfor-
tunately Sober andWilson do not provide an argument for this key claim. What
follows is the most plausible way of developing such an argument in my view.
Take a population of individuals in an environment and consider the ‘đtness
structure’ generated by that environment. ăis đtness structure is the mapping
which speciđes how an individual’s đtness is determined by her character and by
the characters of the individuals with whom she interacts. Take for illustration
the function !i = 2Expg(z)   12zi. Now consider a hypothetical alteration to
this đtness structure such that each individual in any given collective g will now
enjoy the same đtness as the other individuals in collective g. More precisely the
đtness an individual is to enjoy under this alteration is identical to the mean đt-
ness—prior to this alteration—of the individuals in her collective. Sticking with
the above illustration, !i becomes equal to 2Expg(z)  12Expg(z). In other words
it’s equal to 3
2
Expg(z). Call such alterations ‘Structural Collapse to the Mean’
(SCM) alterations. ăis alteration is one straightforwardway of eliminating any
17See pp. 54, 66–67, 80–91, 115, 139 of Sober and Wilson ([1998]) for textual evidence;
indeed see Sober ([1984]). At any rate my criticism of Sober andWilson’ idea as reconstructed
in Sections 6 and 7 will work just as well if you substitute ‘đtness’ for ‘character’ and ‘character’
for ‘đtness’. ăis is because covariance is symmetric: Cov(!; z) = Cov(z; !). So themathematical
reasoning inmy criticismwill hold even if Sober andWilsonmean ‘variation in character’ rather
than ‘variation in đtness’.
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within-collective variation in individual đtness.
Notehowever that theSCMalterationpreserves themeanđtness of themem-
bers of each collective, and thus preserves collective đtness. But individual char-
acter is also preserved; so collective character is preserved. ăus the SCM alter-
ation preserves the covariance of collective đtness with collective character. In
other words SCMpreserves the value of the second term of themulti-level Price
decomposition. And this is equivalent to saying that the independence crite-
rion for explanatory value, on its original rendering, is satisđed here.18 Inciden-
tally, let  denote the effect of SCMupon character–đtness covariance across the
whole population; that is, its effect on the value of the leĕ-hand term in the de-
composition. SCMhaving preserved the value of the second term, it follows that
this effect  is measured by the attendant change in the value of the third term
in the decomposition. And this is equivalent to saying that the independence
criterion for explanatory value, on the alternate rendering, is satisđed here.
Having established that my đrst criterion for explanatory value is satisđed
with respect to hypothetical SCM alterations, can we now establish my second
criterion, the interestingness criterion? Is theSCMeliminationofwithin-collective
variation in đtness especially interesting to biologists? I will now argue that are
some cases in which the answer is no.
Recall the example in which !i = 2Expg(z)   12zi which we can rewrite as
2Expg(z)   zi   12( zi). Let’s imagine that this describes the đtness structure
for the Polistes fuscatus wasp in a given environment. Wasps with high z scores
are hard workers. And wasps enjoy đtness beneđts when they are in a collective
whose members are hard working; hence the 2Expg(z) term. But working hard
requires a costly expenditure of energy; hence the zi term. But those lazywasps
who do not work hard run the risk of being stung by the queen, and indeed the
risk of other forms of retaliation from the queen (Gamboa et al. [1990]); hence
the 1
2
( zi) term.
In the case of the Polistes wasp there is indeed a highly interesting way of al-
tering the đtness structure that eliminates within-collective variation in đtness.
One imagines an increases in retaliatory capacity: queens are better able to iden-
tify the lazy workers, or the queens increase the severity of the punishment for
those who are so identiđed. In particular it will be interesting to know what
would happen were the 1
2
coefficient—the retaliation parameter so to speak—to
be altered such that each individual in a collective enjoys the sameđtness; within-
collective variation thus being eliminated. One can calculate that the answer is
that the coefficient becomes 1 and that !i becomes 2Expg(z).
It is crucial to note however that this highly interesting hypothetical alter-
18Moreover one can easily show that SCM alters the value of the third term to zero. So the
magnitude of this attendant change in the third term is given by the unaltered third term itself.
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ation to đtness structure is distinct from the Structural Collapse to the Mean
alteration I considered above. Aĕer all, recall that the SCM alteration has it in-
stead that !i becomes equal to 32Expg(z); not to 2Expg(z). In contrast, there is
nothing of especial biological interest I contend in the SCM alteration applied
to our wasp population. Such alterations have no greater interest than hypothet-
ical alterations that eliminate within-collective variation by letting !i become
7
13
Expg(z), or to lnExpg(z), or that collapse individual đtness to the collectiveme-
dian or the collective mode, or so on.
ăis illustrates how the Structural Collapse to theMean alteration is not bi-
ologically interesting across every case in general. In other words SCM does not
in general satisfy my second criterion for explanatory value. But I’ve been con-
sidering hypothetical SCM alterations in an attempt to develop Sober andWil-
son’s analysis into an argument that establishes a general explanatory role for the
multi-level Price equation. And one can now see that this attempt has failed.
I emphasise that my intention here is not to criticise the application of the
multi-level Price theorem to the Polistes wasp case. Aĕer all, the theorem is just
a mathematical truth. Rather I am urging a more sanguine assessment of its ex-
planatory value in this case. Aĕer all, nothing that I’ve said so far establishes that
the decomposition adds any explanatory depth.
ăere will, of course, be some theorists who will resist my conclusion here by
objecting to my relatively narrow conception of what is biologically interesting.
I cannot hope to fully persuade such objectors. But I do hope to persuade them
of a somewhatmoremodest point: the SCMalteration in the wasp case is just as
interesting as the inđnity of other hypothetical alterations to the distribution of
đtnesses—such as those that let !i become 713Expg(z), or lnExpg(z), or so on. It
follows that, in the case of the Polistes wasp, we have not established that the ex-
planatory value of the multi-level Price decomposition will be any greater than
the inđnity of other mathematical decompositions of character–đtness covari-
ance. We’ve not identiđed any special explanatory value for the decomposition
in the case of the Polistes wasp.
5 Explanatory DepthWhenever Resources are Subtractable
One question naturally arises from the last section. Can one appeal to SCM al-
terations in order to establish the explanatory value of themulti-level Price equa-
tion in a more limited class of cases, rather than across all cases in general? ăis
section will identify a class of cases in which Structural Collapse to the Mean
alterations are biologically interesting. In other words I identify a class of cases
that satisfy my second criterion (interestingness) for explanatory value. ăese
cases are, namely, those cases in which the sharing-out of resources amongst the
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individuals in a collective is, in the parlance of economics, subtractable. But I’ve
already shown in Section 3 that my third criterion (knowledge) is satisđed by
the multi-level Price decomposition. And I’ve just shown in Section 4 that my
đrst criterion (independence) is satisđedwith respect tohypothetical SCMalter-
ations. So all my three conditions are satisđed here. ăus this section establishes
the explanatory value for the multi-level Price decomposition in a limited class
of cases, namely those in which the sharing-out of resources is subtractable.
Before getting down to business, I will need to invest a substantial amount
of time carefully illustrating what I mean by subtractability. An excellent illus-
tration of the subtractability of resources in a biological context is found in the
literature on social or cooperative foraging (Giraldeau and Caraco [2000]). To
see this, note that many social foraging models can be thought of as having two
parts. Consider the amount of food that a collective of foragers will gather. ăe
resource acquisition part of themodel describes how this amount depends upon
the cooperative behaviour of the members of the collective, and upon the envi-
ronment. ăe resource sharing-out part of themodel describes how this amount
is divided amongst the individual members of the collective. Now, to talk of re-
sources being genuinely ‘shared out’ here presupposes the following: there is an
‘analytic separation’ of the allocation of resources into a mechanism whereby a
collective acquires its resources, and a mechanism whereby these resources are
shared out amongst the individual members of the collective. By this very stip-
ulation, resource sharing-out is subtractable only if these mechanisms are ana-
lytically separable. ăis is the đrst of my two individually necessary and jointly
sufficient conditions for subtractability.
Let me be clear about analytic separation. I don’t intendmy deđnition of an-
alytic separation to turn upon any substantial notion of ‘mechanism’. Similarly
I allow that two analytically separable mechanisms may operate simultaneously,
that they may interact, and that they may have overlapping parts. Instead, what
I mean by ‘analytic separation’ is that there is a biologically interesting alteration
to the manner in which resources are divided out amongst individuals, an alter-
ation which leaves unaltered the manner in which resources are collectively ac-
quired. Tomake this intuitive, consider for example those ‘scroungers’ who have
‘cheated’ by refusing to cooperate during foraging. Inmany cases it is biologically
interesting to ask what would occur if it became more difficult for scroungers to
gain access to the food that the collective has foraged. What if, in the extreme,
scroungers were excluded from these resources altogether?
My second condition on subtractability is also rather intuitive. Rough and
informal version: whenever one individual consumes a resource it must reduce
the quantity of the resource available for other users to consume. To spell out
the second condition formally I will make the simplifying assumption that one
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can use a single variable Rg to quantify the resources that a collective g has ac-
quired. In a simple foraging case this is just the quantity of food that the col-
lective has foraged. Furthermore I will assume that Rg is entirely determined
by the ‘pro-social’ character of each member of collective g, characters which
one might represent by the vector zg. (In a simple foraging case this pro-social
character might measure how much energy the individual in question chooses
to invest in the group hunt.) To emphasise this point I will oĕen write collective
resources Rg as Rg(zg) highlighting that it is a function of zg, and indeed of zg
alone. Now consider the sum total of the đtnesses of the members of a collective
g; in formal termsPg !i. ăe sharing-out of collective resources is subtractable
I stipulate only if this total đtness is entirely determined by collective resources
Rg(zg); more speciđcally just in case this total đtness is an increasing function of
collective resources. Choose the right scale on which to measure resources and
this becomes the requirement that the đtness structure is characterised by:X
g
!i = Rg(zg) (2)
Why is this requirement a đtting formalization of the rough and informal
condition on subtractability that I gave above? Notice that were any individual
to be đtter than they actually are—but collective resources to remain as they ac-
tually are—then Equation 2 requires that some other individual or individuals
would be less đt than they actually are, and by an equal amount. In the foraging
case, holding đxed the amount of food collectively foraged, one individual’s gain
in đtness is precisely counterbalanced by another’s loss.
It is of crucial importance to emphasise that thepresent requirement—concerning
whatwouldhappenwere collective resources to remain as they actually are—obviously
does not entail that collective resources must remain as they actually are. ăere-
fore there will be many subtractable đtness structures for which collective re-
sources vary according to the distribution of individual characters within the
collective. In the foraging case for example the amount of food foraged Rg(zg)
can vary depending on how the individuals are inclined to cooperate during the
hunt, asmeasured by zg. So I emphasise that subtractability of resources does not
entail that individuals are playing a zero-sum game that precludes them from co-
operating to increase collective resources. A similar point: subtractability does
not entail that the đtness structure in play is additive. In other words it does not
entail that the đtness structure be given by !i = zi + Expg(z).
In summary, I stipulate that the sharing-out of resources is subtractable just
in case (i) one can analytically separate resource allocation into a mechanism of
resource acquisition and into a mechanism of resource division, and (ii) Equa-
tion 2 characterises the đtness structure in play.
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A second illustration of the subtractability of resources comes from simple
diploid genetics models. An AB genotype causes the organism in which it is in-
stantiated to exemplify a corresponding phenotype, and this organism interacts
with the environment and has a number of offspring. And these offspring by ex-
tension are counted as the offspring of the AB genotype itself. Call this process
the acquisition of the AB genotype’s reproductive resources. (I’m happy to be
fairly liberal about what counts as a resource.) Consider next that during meio-
sis the A allele in the AB genotype will be copied to a certain number of gametes
and so will enjoy a particular chance of being represented in each of the afore-
mentioned organism’s offspring. ăe same goes for the B allele. Call this the
sharing-out of the AB genotype’s reproductive resources amongst its two alleles,
A and B. Again one can analytically separate resource allocation into collective
resource acquisition and the sharing-out of these resources between individu-
als. For it is biologically interesting to ask what would occur if meiosis were to
unfold differently: what if segregation distortion (Lyttle [1991]) occurred and
the A-allele in the AB genotype enjoyed more than its đĕy-percent share of re-
productive resources (Maynard Smith and Szathmary [1995], x10)? So my đrst
condition for subtractability is satisđed here. Equally my second condition for
subtractability is also satisđed here: holding the AB genotype’s resources đxed,
an increased chance of the A-allele of being represented amongst the organism’s
offspring would be precisely counterbalanced by a decreased chance for the B-
allele.
Finally, an example in which resources are, in contrast, not shared-out sub-
tractably is that of the Polistes wasp. In this case a worker’s đtness is sensitive to
whether he is stung by the Queen. In virtue of this, avoiding being stung by the
Queen is a key resource. But it would be absurd to attempt to analytically sep-
arate the allocation of this sting-avoidance resource into a mechanism whereby
the wasp collective acquires sting-avoidance, and a mechanism in which sting-
avoidance is then shared out amongst individual wasps. So this resource is, by
my deđnition, not ‘shared out’. A second example in which resources are not
shared-out subtractably is that of beavers building a channel from their dam to
the river bank. I concede that one can analytically separate resource acquisition
and resource sharing-out here. But one beaver’s using this channel does not ex-
clude other beavers from doing likewise. So this sharing-out is not subtractable.
Almost there. I want now to make Equation 2 easier to work with mathe-
matically. Consider the following constraint on the đtness !i of each individual
i in collective g:
!i = (
1
n
  [zi   Expg(z)])Rg(zg) (3)
Letmeunpack this equation. Expg(z) is just the average character of themembers
of collective g. So [zi   Expg(z)] denotes the degree to which our individual
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i scores especially highly on pro-social character z. In other words whenever
an individual has a perfectly average character then this becomes zero and the
overall expression reduces to 1
n
Rg(zg). In other words, whenever this is so, this
individual’s đtness is equal to collective resourcesRg(zg) divided by the number
of members of the collective n. So whenever an individual is perfectly average
she receives her ‘fair share’ of collective resources.
Similarly note that whenever an individual scores especially highly for pro-
social character z then the  [zi   Expg(z)] term will be negative; assuming 
is positive. So she will enjoy a lesser proportion of the collective’s resources and
thus she will be less đt. Conversely whenever an individual scores especially low
on z—in other words she has an especially ‘anti-social’ character—then this ex-
pression will be positive. And so she will enjoy a greater proportion of collective
resources and thus will be more đt. So the  parameter denotes the degree to
which anti-social individuals can command an unfair share of the resources that
the collective has acquired. ăus parameter measures an important feature of
the sharing-out of resources between individuals, as opposed to a feature of col-
lective resource acquisition itself. It is a feature of the đtness-structure generated
by the environment.
(Table 2 illustrates the đtness structure that Equation 3 requires in a simple
case; namely in the case of two-membered collectives, and inwhich an individual
either has character z fully or not at all. In formal terms z = 0 or z = 1.)
who interact with who interact with
a Z individual a non-Z individual
Fitness of Z individuals 1
2
R (1
2
  1
2
)R0
Fitness of non-Z individuals (1
2
+ 1
2
)R0 1
2
R00
Table 2: Fitness of each individual in the subtractability case
Take the expression in round brackets in Equation 3 and sum it over all in-
dividuals in the collective. Since this necessarily sums to one it is evident that
Equation 3 entails Equation 2. But I don’t believe that to assume subtractabil-
ity in the speciđc form of Equation 3 rather than more generally in the form of
Equation 2 amounts to a signiđcant loss in generality.19 So from now on I will
workwithEquation 3 as part ofmydeđnition of subtractability, rather thanwith
Equation 2.
Having carefully illustrated what I mean by subtractability, one can now get
down to business. I will now show that the multi-level Price decomposition has
the ancillary role of answering questions about how character z would evolve if
19Frank’s ([1995]) model however satisđes Equation 2 but not Equation 3.
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anti-socially inclined individualswerenotpermittedunfair access to subtractable
resources.
Suppose that the sharing-out of resources amongst individuals is subtractable.
Hence it can be characterised by a parameter  which measures the degree to
which the đtness-structure in play permits anti-socially inclined individuals to
access more than their fair share of collective resources. So intuitively, and as
Equation 3 conđrms, altering  to become zero will reduce within-collective
variation in đtness to zero. In these circumstances all individuals will receive
an equal share of đtness, namelyRg(zg) divided by n. (One example of this is an
alteration of the visual environment such that would-be cheaters can be spotted,
and thereby prevented from stealing extra resources.) But this hypothetical al-
teration of  is evidently a Structural Collapse to the Mean alteration. And I’ve
already shown in Section 4 that all SCM alterations satisfy the independence
criterion for explanatory value: the effect  of this SCM alteration will be mea-
sured by the attendant change to the value of the third term in the multi-level
Price decomposition.20
My second criterion (interestingness) for explanatory value requires that this
alteration to  be of interest to biologists. Note, however, that the genuine
sharing-out of resources—as I’ve deđned it—entails that one can analytically
separate resource allocation into the acquisition of resources by the collective
and the sharing-out of these resources amongst individuals. ăis in turn en-
tails—againbymydeđnition—that there is an interesting alteration to themech-
anism of sharing-out resources amongst individuals, an alteration that does not
alter how these resources were acquired by the collective. ăerefore all cases of
subtractable sharing-out will be cases in which alterations to  are biologically
interesting. So my interestingness criterion for explanatory value is, by deđni-
tion, satisđed in cases in which resources are genuinely shared out.
Here are two such cases; just to illustrate that such cases plausibly exist. Case
one:  measures the degree to which visual environment is such that cheating
foragers can go undetected, and therefore can steal resources rather than being
excluded from them. Case two: in the population genetics example, measures
the degree of so-called segregation distortion, the extent to which the meiotic
20Moreover one can show that the relationship between the third term of the Price equation
and  is a linear one. For observe that it follows from Equation 3 that
Covg(!; z) = Covg([
1
n
  z + Expg(z)]Rg; z) = Rg(zg)Varg(z) (4)
But one can substitute this intoExp[Covg(!; z)], the third termof themulti-level Price decompo-
sition, to yield Exp[Rg(zg)Varg(z)]. And this yields Exp[Rg(zg)Varg(z)]. For, being a feature
of the environment,  doesn’t vary from collective to collective. So the third term of the Price
decomposition depends linearly upon .
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environment allows selđsh alleles to enjoymore than their fair share of represen-
tation in the offspring organisms. ăese are just two examples of a biologically
interesting  parameter. So my interestingness criterion for explanatory value is
satisđed non-trivially.
But I’ve already shown in Section 3 that the third criterion (knowledge) for
explanatory value is in general satisđed by the multi-level Price decomposition.
So all three of my criteria are satisđed. ăus this section has established an ex-
planatory role for the multi-level Price decomposition in a limited class of cases;
namely cases in which the sharing-out of resources is subtractable. In such cases
themulti-level Price decomposition deepens single-level explanations of the evo-
lutionof character z basedonpopulation-level character–đtness covariance alone.
To put it intuitively, it has the ancillary role of answering questions about what
would happen if anti-socially inclined individuals could no longer gain unfair
access to subtractable resources.
Recall that section 4 showed that appealing to SCMalterations cannot estab-
lish everything that Sober andWilson want to establish. For it cannot establish
the explanatory value of the multi-level Price decomposition across all cases in
general; for example the case of retaliation in wasps. Instead the present section
has shown how appealing to SCM alterations establishes the explanatory value
of the decomposition in the special case in which the sharing-out of resources is
more or less subtractable. Unfortunately, I contend, there are no other obvious
cases in which SCM alterations have any biological interest. (See my discussion
in Section 4.) So it’s likely that appealing to SCM alterations can only establish
the explanatory value of the multi-level Price decomposition in cases in which
resources are more or less subtractable.
6 Other Alterations toWithin-Collective Variation
ăere are hypothetical alterations other than SCM, however, which eliminate
within-collective variation. ăis naturally raises the following question: can one
appeal to any of these other alterations in order to establish a further explana-
tory role for the multi-level Price decomposition? Perhaps the decomposition
does indeed have a general explanatory role, or at very least a role in some cases
in which resources are not subtractably shared-out. As I will illustrate momen-
tarily, however, I can’t đnd any such alterations which obviously satisfy the inde-
pendence and interestingness criteria for explanatory value simultaneously; even
for a limited range of cases. ăerefore it’s likely that appealing to (alterations to)
within-collective variation can establish no more than Section 5 did: the multi-
level Price decomposition is explanatorily valuable in cases in which resources
are more or less subtractable.
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ăis sectionwill supportmy claimhere by examining three alternatives to the
Structural Collapse to theMean alteration: the ‘Increased Retaliatory Capacity’
alteration, the ‘Homogenizing Assortment’ alteration, and the ‘Character Col-
lapse to the Mean’ alteration as I will label them.
Character Collapse to the Mean. Consider a collective of vampire bats com-
posed of a few very đt members and many very unđt ones. Imagine for example
a đve-member collective containing individuals with đtnesses ! = 1; 1; 1; 2; and
10. Imagine altering the character of every member in the collective, and in turn
their đtnesses, such that they are allmoderately đt. Imagine in particular that this
yields đtnesses of ! = 3; 3; 3; 3; and 3. ăus by altering character, đtnesses have
been collapsed to the collective mean. So within-collective variation in đtness
has been eliminated. Note that this Character Collapse to the Mean (CCM)
alteration differs from the Structural Collapse to the Mean alteration in that it
does not alter đtness via altering đtness structure; instead it does so by altering
the frequency of the character in the population.
To see an immediate problem for appealing to CCM alterations, calculate
the values of the second term in the multi-level Price decomposition for the ex-
ample given in Table 3: the term is originally 90 but falls to 84 under the CCM
alteration. SoCCMdoesn’t just alter the value of the third termof the decompo-
sition;21 it also alters the value of the second term. In other words, with respect
to the CCM alteration in this case, the independence criterion for explanatory
value is not satisđed. ăerefore one cannot appeal to the CCM alteration to
identify an explanatory role for the multi-level Price decomposition for all cases
in general.
Original z Original ! CCM z CCM !
3 1 24 2
24 2 24 2
81 3 24 2
- - - -
81 3 192 4
192 4 192 4
375 5 192 4
Table 3: Character Collapse to the Mean for two three-membered collectives
and with !i = 13 3
p
zi
But this raises the following question: might appeals to CCM establish the
explanatory value of themulti-level Price decomposition in amore limited range
21Which it alters to zero; see Section 4.
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of cases, rather than across all cases in general? Take for instance cases in which
collective character maps one-to-one onto collective đtness. One can show that
the hypothetical CCM alteration does satisfy my independence criterion for ex-
planatory value in such cases. ăis is because the CCM alteration will preserve
collective đtness. And so, given the one-to-one mapping, it will preserve collec-
tive character. And so it will in turn preserve the covariance of collective đtness
and collective character. In other words CCMwill not alter the second term of
the multi-level Price decomposition in this case. So the independence criterion
for explanatory value is met.
What about the interestingness criterion however? I certainly do not want
to claim that cases of one-to-one mapping are uninteresting as such. Indeed this
range of cases includes as a subset an important range of cases, namely those
in which individual đtness is ‘additive’.22 Additive cases are those in which đt-
ness is a linear function of individual character and collective character: !i =
zi + Expg(z). ăus collective character maps one-to-one onto collective đt-
ness: Expg(!) = (+ )Expg(z).23
Instead what I want to question is the biological interest of the Character
Collapse to theMean alteration itself. Aĕer all, the problems I identiđed in Sec-
tion 4 with respect to the Structural Collapse to the Mean alteration can all be
extended to Character Collapse to the Mean. For there is no range of cases—at
least obviously—forwhichhypothetical collapses to the erstwhilemean aremore
biologically interesting than collapses to any other value (Section 4). ăus it is
unlikely that CCM alterations ever satisfy the interestingess criterion explana-
tory value; even in a more limited range of cases.
Homogenizing Assortment. One biologically interesting alteration is the alter-
ation to the mechanism of ‘assortment’, the mechanism that determines which
individuals in a population join themselves into collectives with which other in-
dividuals. For example one might imagine that the mechanism of assortment is
altered such that individuals only interact with individuals of a similar character.
In the extreme case then assortment will be fully homogenous: within-collective
variation in character will be zero. And therefore within-collective variation in
đtness will be zero. ăus the Homogenizing Assortment (HA) alteration dif-
fers from the CCM alteration in that it does not alter the overall composition
of characters in the population, merely how individuals are assorted into collec-
tives. It is clear that this HA alteration is in general biologically interesting. In
other words it satisđes my second criterion for explanatory value.
22See Birch ([2014]) for a discussion of assumptions similar to this additivity assumption but
in a slightly different context.
23I note incidentally that cases of one-to-one mapping exclude any form of synergism. In
other words, it precludes individuals coordinating their activities so that the beneđt to the col-
lective is greater than the sum of each individual’s own efforts.
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Unfortunately, with respect to theHomogenizingAssortment alteration,my
independence criterion for explanatory value is not satisđed; except perhaps in
a gerrymandered range of cases. To see this, note that HA only alters how in-
dividuals in the whole population are grouped into collectives. It preserves the
overall compositionof characters in thepopulation. But take the very simple case
in which an individual’s đtness only depends upon her own character. It follows
that HA preserves each individual’s đtness here. In summary, it preserves the
joint distribution of character and đtness in the overall population.24 In such
cases thereforeHA does not affect character–đtness covariance across the whole
population. In formal terms, the effect of HA on the value of leĕ-hand term
of the multi-level Price decomposition is zero. But the attendant change to the
third term will be non-zero.25 It follows that HA also affects the value of the
second term. In other words, with respect to the Homogenizing Assortment al-
teration, my independence criterion for explanatory value is not satisđed in this
very simple case. And there is noobvious range ofmore complex cases, I contend,
for which one might expect HA not to alter the second term; as well as altering
the third term. Or at least not for any non-gerrymandered range of cases. ăere-
fore, I contend, it is unlikely that HA alterations ever satisfy the independence
criterion for explanatory value; even in a more limited range of cases.
Increasing Retaliatory Capacity. Recall the Polisteswasp example in which đt-
ness was given by 2Expg(z) zi  12( zi). ăis is a special case of themore general
đtness structure !i = f(zg)  p( zi); where p is the parameter that measures re-
taliatory capacity (Section 4). Consider the hypothetical alteration inwhich this
parameter is increased by p: queen wasps can for example more easily punish
lazy workers, or punish them more severely. One can easily show that this In-
creasing Retaliatory Capacity (IRC) alteration increases the value of the second
term of the multi-level Price decomposition, namely by Var[Expg(z)]p. Ruling
out the trivial case in which there is no variation in collective character, this ex-
pression will be non-zero. In other words IRC doesn’t just alter the value of the
third term of the decomposition,26 but also the value of the second term. So the
IRC alteration fails the independence criterion for the explanatory value of the
decomposition in all non-trivial cases.
24I am most grateful to Cedric Patternotte for spotting, prior to publication, a subtle but
egregious error at this point.
25Homogenizing Assortment will eliminate the variation within any collective. So it will
eliminate the character–đtness covariance within any collective. So it ensures that the value of
the third term of the multi-level Price decomposition Exp[Covg(!; z)] will become zero. Setting
aside the trivial case in which within-collective variation was already zero, this demonstrates that
the attendant change to the value of the third term is non-zero.
26ăe attendant change to the third term is, one can show: Exp[Varg(z)]p. And this is only
zero when there is no within-collective variation in individual character.
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Totake stock, this sectionhas considered three alterations towithin-collective
variation: IncreasingRetaliatoryCapacity,HomogenizingAssortment, andChar-
acter Collapse to the Mean. And I’ve shown decisively that one cannot appeal
to the IRC alterations to identify any explanatory role for the multi-level Price
decomposition at all. And I’ve shown decisively that one cannot appeal to the
CCMorHA alterations to identify a general explanatory role for the decompo-
sition in all cases. Moreover it’s unlikely that we can đnd an explanatory role by
appealing toCCMorHA in even amore limited range of cases; excluding gerry-
mandered ranges of cases. So an appeal to any of these three alterations—CCM,
IRC, or HA—to establish any explanatory role for the multi-level Price decom-
position is unlikely to be successful. ăerefore, the SCM alteration from Sec-
tions 4 and 5 is the only alteration of within-collective variation to which one
might successfully appeal. ăe tentative conclusion is that appealing to (alter-
ations to) within-collective variation can establish no more than Section 5 did:
the multi-level Price decomposition is explanatorily valuable in cases in which
resources are more or less subtractable.
7 Alterations to Between-Collective Variation
Sections 4 to 6 askedwhether appealing to (alterations to)within-collective vari-
ation can establish the explanatory value of themulti-level Price decomposition.
ăis was prompted by Sober andWilson’s suggestion that the third term of the
decompositionmeasures the effects ofwithin-collective variation. But Sober and
Wilson, I’ve already noted, also place a lot of weight upon an idea that is sym-
metrical to this one: the second termof themulti-level Price decompositionmea-
sures the effects of between-collective variation. If this symmetrical idea is true,
then we have an additional strategy for vindicating the decomposition: appeal
to alterations to between-collective variation in đtness. Unfortunately, it turns
out that it is very difficult to construct a plausible argument that favours Sober
andWilson’s symmetrical idea. ăe following is my best attempt, but one which
ultimately fails.
Take a đve-member collective with individual đtnesses of ! = 1; 3; 6; 6; and
9; and thus of average đtness 5. Consider a hypothetical alteration that changes
the character of each member such that their đtness is ‘boosted’ by one unit,
resulting in a đve-member collective with đtnesses of ! = 2; 4; 7; 7; 10, and thus
of average đtness 6. Note that it’s a mathematical fact that this alteration won’t
alter within-collective variation in đtness. Consider also a second đve-member
collective with individual đtnesses of ! = 1; 6; 8; 10; and 10; and thus of average
đtness 7. But this time consider a ‘boost’ of minus one unit, so that this second
collective now also has an average đtness of 6. ăus all collectives are altered to
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have the same collectiveđtness, in this case6, thus eliminatingbetween-collective
variation in collective đtness. Consequently this Uniform Boosting alteration
reduces to zero any covariance of collective đtness with other factors. ăerefore
Cov[Expg(!); Expg(z)], the second term of the multi-level Price decomposition,
will become zero.
Calculate, however, the values of the third term in the multi-level Price de-
composition for the example given inTable 4: the term is originally 62but falls to
56 under the Uniform Boosting alteration. In other words, with respect to Uni-
formBoosting, themulti-level Price decomposition doesn’t in general satisfy the
independence criterion for explanatory value. Moreover, let  denote the effect
of thisUniformBoosting alteration upon character–đtness covariance across the
whole population; that is, upon the value of the leĕ-hand term in themulti-level
Price decomposition. Uniform Boosting having altered the value of the third
term, it follows that this effect  is not measured by the attendant change to the
second term of the multi-level Price decomposition. Sober and Wilson’s sym-
metrical idea does not in general hold for all cases.
Original z Original ! Boost z Boost !
3 1 24 2
24 2 81 3
81 3 192 4
- - - -
81 3 24 2
192 4 81 3
375 5 192 4
Table 4: Uniform Boosting for two three-membered collectives and with !i =
1
3
3
p
zi
One response might be to insist that nevertheless the attendant change in
the second term measures effect  in a limited but non-gerrymandered class of
cases. Take for example those cases in which an individual’s đtness is a linear
functionof that individual’s owncharacter alone; put in formal terms!i = mzi+
c. Whenever the đtness of each member of a collective is uniformly boosted by
k, then each member’s character will have been uniformly boosted by k
m
, given
this linear relationship. But the logic of covariance has it that Covg(! + k; z +
k
m
) = Covg(!; z). So Uniform Boosting preserves the value of the third term in
this case. It follows that this effect  is measured by the attendant change to the
second term of the multi-level Price decomposition.
Unfortunately this class of cases is a completely irrelevant class for present
purposes. For there’s an intuitive sense in which there is no selection at the level
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of the collective at all in such cases. Aĕer all, in such cases individual đtness is not
inĔuenced by the collective at all. And I have no doubt that Sober and Wilson
would agree with this point. ăis is because, applying their own 1998 deđnition
of ‘trait groups’, there are no genuine collectives in this special case. And hence
there is no genuine collective-level selection.
So theproblemremains: consider this effect of eliminatingbetween-collective
variation viaUniformBoosting, that is, the effect upon the value of the leĕ-hand
term of the multi-level Price decomposition. I contend that there is no obvi-
ous non-gerrymandered class of relevant cases for which this effect  is measured
by the attendant change to the second term of the decomposition. So, with re-
spect to the Uniform Boosting alteration, it is unlikely that there are any cases
for which the independence criterion for explanatory value holds. So appeals to
Uniform Boosting are unlikely to establish any explanatory value for the multi-
level Price decomposition. But there are no other obvious, biologically inter-
esting ways—I contend—to alter between-collective variation. I conclude that
appeals to (alterations of ) between-collective variation are unlikely to establish
any explanatory value for the decomposition.
8 Alternative Approaches to Explanatory Depth
ăis paper has taken for granted that the depth of an explanation is in propor-
tion, roughly speaking, to the number of important what-if questions that it al-
lows one to answer. But why should one accept this? I cannot offer a full defence
of this view, although interested evolutionary biologists might consult Wood-
ward ([2003]), which has quickly become a philosophical classic. Instead this
sectionwill brieĔy examine the prospects for an alternative approach to explana-
tory depth, one that draws upon alternative accounts of explanation.
ăe đrst thing to note is that the philosophical literature contains scarcely
any alternatives to the what-if account of explanatory depth. Why, for example,
did the patient die? Hempel’s Deductive Nomological approach might say that
the following was a correct explanation: the patient ingested a large dose of dig-
italis, and it’s a law that all people who ingest that dose will die soon aĕerwards
(Hempel and Oppenheim [1948]). But Hempel’s account is not an account of
explanatory depth. For it does not offer us a criterion according to which this
explanation counts as less deep than an explanation that includes details about
how digitalis is metabolised and how it affects the heart. Hempel’s approach is
an account of explanatory correctness, not an account of the depth of a correct
explanation.
Next considerKitcher’s ([1981]; [1989]) uniđcationist approach to explana-
tion. Kitcher provides a criterion for what one might call explanatory promise,
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the ability of a candidate explanation to deepen one’s understanding of what one
already knows. And famously Kitcher’s approach is a ‘winner takes all’ account.
Indeed it cannot bemodiđed to admit degrees of explanatory promise on pain of
admitting some embarrassing counter-examples (Woodward [2003], p. 368).27
So—even if one were willing to equate explanatory promise with explanatory
depth—Kitcher’s approach doesn’t delineate degrees of explanatory depth.
Kitcher’s approach shouldnotbe confusedwith themoremodest—and thereby
more plausible—idea that there are at least two virtues with respect to which an
explanatory framework such as the multi-level selection framework can be as-
sessed. ăe đrst virtue is what I’ve called depth, which I’ve urged is to be cashed
out in terms of what-if questions. ăe second virtue is cashed out in terms of
the framework’s scope of correct application: the broader the range of cases that
can be correctly explainedwithin that framework, themore ‘unifying’ the frame-
work.28 But it is evident that anyone tempted by this more modest uniđcation-
ist idea will have no complaints with the assumptions that this paper has made
about explanatory depth. All that the modest uniđcationist insists upon is that
one also acknowledge the existence of an additional dimension to explanatory
frameworks, uniđcation qua broad scope of correct application.
I’m happy to do so. Admittedly I’ve said very little about the relative scope
of application of the single-level selection and multi-level selection frameworks.
But this is because the answer is trivial: the multi-level selection framework has
a narrower scope. Aĕer all, it embodies an extra restriction, namely that one’s
population be partitioned into collectives. So, for this trivial reason, the present
consideration concerning breadth of scope is not probative. It does not provide a
sense inwhichmulti-level selection explanations add value over and above single-
level selection explanations.
Finally let’s consider the causal approach to explanation. Why have I been
talking about the explanatorydepthof themulti-level Price decomposition, rather
than asOkasha ([2004b]; [2004c]) does ofwhether thedecomposition is ‘causally
adequate’ or ‘causally inadequate’? Mymain reason is that the notion of a decom-
position’s being causally adequate is incredibly tricky (Okasha [Forthcoming]).
ăat is why I have leĕ the discussion in this paper incomplete as a far as causal
questions are concerned. But one might worry that in ‘ignoring’ causation the
discussion in this paper is in danger of being not just incomplete but also un-
sound. I will now address this worry.
I’ve taken for granted through-out this paper that thedepthof an explanation
is, roughly speaking, in proportion to thenumber of importantwhat-if questions
27Indeed see Woodward ([2003], x8) for what I take to be decisive counter-examples to the
view overall.
28Birch ([2014], x5) proposes this more modest approach, although he seems to suggest that
there is a sensible way of aggregating these two virtues into one overall score.
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that it helps to answer. And I’ve noted that the importance of a what-if question
is in part determined by our personal interests. But philosophers who favour the
causal approach to explanation might wish to place an additional restriction on
what counts as an important what-if question. ăe causal restriction: a what-if
question is only important if the correct answer to it cites a cause of the to-be-
explained event. I have no doubt that Lewis ([1986]), Lipton ([1991]), Ruben
([1990]), and Woodward ([2003]) amongst others would endorse this restric-
tion.29
Adding this restriction, however, makes no difference to the soundness of the
arguments of this paper. Firstly my criticism of Sober andWilson in Sections 4
and 6 relied primarily on the fact that certainwhat-if questions are uninteresting.
And so my criticism required only that interestingness be a necessary condition
for a what-if question to be important. It did not require that interestingness
constitute the only necessary condition on importance. Secondly my positive
point in Section 5 relied primarily on the importance of questions about what
would happen were parameter  to be different. What happens to my argument
if we add the requirement that  has to be a cause of the evolution of social char-
acter z in order for such questions to count as important? Nothing. For there is
no reason to think that —an interesting feature of the environment that deter-
mines howmuch command anti-social individuals have over resources—cannot
be a cause of the evolution of character z. So endorsing a causal approach to
explanation does not generate a reason to resist the conclusions of this paper.
ăis concludes my defence of the measure of the depth of an explanation as,
roughly, the number of important what-if questions that it helps to answer.
9 Conclusion
Sections 2 and 8 built and defended a general framework through which to un-
derstand the explanatory role of non-empirical decompositions such as themulti-
level Price decomposition. Such decompositions have the ancillary role of de-
scribing the constitutive relationships that help glue different factors in our ex-
planatory reasoning together. And I provided three individually necessary and
jointly sufficient criteria for a non-empirical decomposition to play this role.
ăis motivated a search to đnd a hypothetical intervention that simultane-
ously meets my independence criterion and my interestingness criterion. Tak-
ing my lead from Sober andWilson, I assume that any such intervention would
either be one that (i) eliminates between-collective variation in đtness, or (ii)
29But note that, given Lewis’ and Woodward’s views of the nature of causation, this restric-
tion is a trivial one: roughly speaking, all answers to (the right sort of ) what if things had been
different questions cite causes.
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eliminates within-collective variation in đtness. And this paper considered đve
interventions in total: (i) UniformBoosting (Section 7); (ii) Increasing Retalia-
tory Capacity (Sections 4 and 6), Structural Collapse to the Mean (Sections 4
and 5), Homogenizing Assortment (Section 6), and Character Collapse to the
Mean (Section 6).
Only some of these hypothetical alterations turn out tomeet my interesting-
ness criterion: HA and IRC are in general interesting; and SCM is interesting
whenever resources are subtractable. In contrast, CCM is of dubious interest.
Similarly, only some of these hypothetical alterationsmeetmy independence cri-
terion. ăat is, only some of these alterations have their effects measured by a
right-hand term of the multi-level Price decomposition: the SCM alteration in
all cases, and theCCMalteration in cases of one-to-onemapping of character to
đtness. All the other interventions likely fail this criterion in all cases, excluding
gerry-mandered ones.
In summary, none of these đve alterations meet both criteria simultaneously
in all cases. Indeed there isn’t even a more limited range of cases for which the
IRC, HA, CCM or the UB alteration meet both criteria simultaneously. How-
ever, in the limited case in which resources are subtractable, the Structural Col-
lapse to the Mean alteration does satisfy both criteria. But I assume that these
đve alterations are the only ones to which one might obviously appeal to in or-
der to establish the explanatory value of the multi-level Price decomposition.
My conclusion is that the decomposition has explanatory value, most likely, pri-
marily when collective resources are more or less subtractable. Its value is more
circumscribed than its champions Sober andWilson ([1998]) believe.
Let me put the main thrust of the paper in intuitive form. What would hap-
pen if environmental conditions made it more difficult for anti-socially inclined
individuals to access an unfair proportion of the subtractable resources acquired
by their collective? I have argued that the explanatory value of the multi-level
Price decomposition is that it helps us to answer such questions; questions about
what would happen were the ‘policing’ of subtractable resources strengthened.
But, I have shown, it does not help answer questions about other cases, or con-
cerning other policing mechanisms such as retaliatory punishment or homoge-
nizing assortment.30
30ăis raises the question of how the paradigm policing mechanisms identiđed in Buss
([1987]) andMichod ([1999]) đt intomy scheme for classifying policing mechanisms; and cru-
cially whether these mechanisms issue in more or less subtractable resources.
28
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Jonathan Birch, Tim Lewens, Samir Okasha, Kim Sterelny, and
twoanonymous referees for their generous andhelpful comments on themanuscript.
European Research Council Grant agreement (284123) under the European
Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013).
.
Christopher Clarke
Department of History and Philosophy of Science
University of Cambridge
Free School Lane, Cambridge, CB2 3RH
cjc84@cam.ac.uk
29
References
Achinstein, P. [1983]: ąe Nature of Explanation, New York: Oxford University Press.
Baker, A. [2009]: ‘Mathematical Explanations in Science’, British Journal for the Philos-
ophy of Science 60: pp. 611–63.
Batterman, R. W. [2010]: ‘On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical Sci-
ence’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61: pp. 1–25.
Birch, J. [2014]: ‘Hamilton’s Rule and its Discontents’, British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science 65: pp. 381–411.
Buss, L. W. [1987]: ąe Evolution of Individuality, Princeton NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Clarke, E. [Forthcoming]: ‘ăeMultiple Realizability of Biological Individuals’, Journal
of Philosophy.
Damuth, J. and I. L.Heisler [1988]: ‘Alternative Formulations ofMulti-Level Selection’,
Biology and Philosophy 3: pp. 407–30.
Darwin, C. [1859]: On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection: JohnMurray.
Citations refer to the Revised Edition (2008) fromOxford University Press.
Dawkins, R. [1976]: ąe SelĖsh Gene, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dawkins, R. [1982]: ąe Extended Phenotype, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dugatkin, L. A. andH. K. Reeve [1994]: ‘Behavioural Ecology and Levels of Selection:
Dissolving the Group Selection Controversy’, in P. Slater, J. Rosenblatt, C. Snodown,
andM.Milinski (eds),Advances in the Study of Behaviour, Volume 23: Academic Press,
pp. 102–134.
Frank, S. A. [1995]: ‘Mutual Policing and Repression of Competition in the Evolution
of Co-operative Groups’,Nature 377: pp. 520–2.
Frank, S. A. [1998]: Foundations of Social Evolution, PrincetonNJ: PrincetonUniversity
Press.
Gamboa, G. J., T. L. Wacker, J. A. Scope, T. J. Cornell, and J. Shellman-Reeve [1990]:
‘ăe Mechanism of Queen Regulation of Foraging by Workers in Paper Wasps
(Polistes fuscatus, Hymenoptera: Vespidae)’, Ethology 85: pp. 335–43.
Giraldeau, L.-A. and T. Caraco [2000]: Social Foragingąeory, PrincetonNJ: Princeton
University Press.
30
Goodnight, C. J., J.M. Schwartz, andL. Stevens [1992]: ‘ContextualAnalysis ofModels
of Group Selection, Soĕ Selection, Hard Selection, and the Evolution of Altruism’,
American Naturalist 140: pp. 743–61.
Hamilton,W. D. [1964]: ‘ăe Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour’, Journal ofąe-
oretical Biology 7: pp. 1–16.
Hamilton, W. D. [1975]: ‘Innate Social Aptitudes in Man: An Approach from Evolu-
tionary Genetics’, in Biosocial Anthropology, New York: Wiley, pp. 133–55.
Hart,H. L.A. andA.Honore [1965]: Causation in theLaw, Oxford: Clarendon–OUP.
Citations refer to the Second Edition (1985).
Heisler, I. L. and J.Damuth [1987]: ‘AMethod forAnalyzingSelection inHierarchically
Structured Populations’, American Naturalist 130: pp. 582–602.
Hempel, C. G. and P. Oppenheim [1948]: ‘Studies in the Logic of Explanation’, Philos-
ophy of Science 15: pp. 135–175.
Hull, D. L. [1981]: ‘Units of Evolution: A Metaphysical Essay’, in U. J. Jensen and
R. Harre (eds),ąe Philosophy of Evolution, Brighton: Harvester Press, pp. 23–44.
Kerr, B. and P. Godfrey-Smith [2002]: ‘Individualist and Multi-Level Perspectives on
Selection in Structured Populations’, Biology and Philosophy 17: pp. 477–517.
Kitcher, P. [1981]: ‘Explanatory Uniđcation’, Philosophy of Science 48: pp. 507–531.
Kitcher, P. [1989]: ‘Explanatory Uniđcation and the Causal Structure of theWorld’, in
P. Kitcher andW. Salmon (eds), ScientiĖc Explanation, Minneapolis MN: University
of Minnesota Press, pp. 410–505.
Lange, M. and A. Rosenberg [2011]: ‘Canăere Be A Priori Causal Models of Natural
Selection?’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89: pp. 591–599.
Lewis, D. K. [1986]: ‘Causal Explanation’, in Philosophical Papers, Volume 2, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Lipton, P. [1991]: Inference to the Best Explanation, London: Routledge.
Lloyd, E. A. [1986]: ‘Evaluation of Evidence inGroup SelectionDebates’,PSA: Proceed-
ings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986: pp. 483–493.
Lloyd, E. A. [2000]: ‘Groups on Groups: Some Dynamics and Possible Resolution of
the Units of Selection Debates in Evolutionary Biology’, Biology and Philosophy 15:
pp. 389–401.
Lyttle, T.W. [1991]: ‘SegregationDistorters’,Annual Review ofGenetics 25: pp. 511–57.
31
Maynard Smith, J. andE. Szathmary [1995]: ąeMajorTransitions inEvolution, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
McElreath, R. and R. Boyd [2007]: Mathematical Models of Social Evolution: A Guide
for the Perplexed, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press.
Michod, R. E. [1999]: Darwinian Dynamics: Evolutionary Transitions in Fitness and In-
dividuality, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Okasha, S. [2004a]: ‘ăe “Averaging Fallacy” and the Levels of Selection’, Biology and
Philosophy 19: pp. 167–84.
Okasha, S. [2004b]: ‘Multi-Level Selection and thePartitioningofCovariance: ACom-
parison ofăree Approaches’, Evolution 58: pp. 486–94.
Okasha, S. [2004c]: ‘Multi-Level Selection, Covariance and Contextual Analysis’,
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55: pp. 481–504.
Okasha, S. [2005]: ‘Maynard Smith on the Levels of Selection Question’, Biology and
Philosophy 20: pp. 989–1010.
Okasha, S. [2006]: Evolution and the Levels of Selection: Oxford University Press.
Okasha, S. [Forthcoming]: ‘ăe Relationship between Kin Selection and Multi-Level
Selection’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Pincock, C. [2007]: ‘A Role for Mathematics in the Physical Sciences’, Nous 41: pp.
253–275.
Price, G. R. [1970]: ‘Selection and Covariance’,Nature 227: pp. 520–521.
Price, G. R. [1972]: ‘Extension of Covariance SelectionMathematics’,Annals of Human
Genetics 35: pp. 485–90.
Robertson, A. [1966]: ‘A Mathematical Model of the Culling Process in Dairy Cattle’,
Animal Production 8: pp. 95–108.
Ruben, D.-H. [1990]: Explaining Explanation, London: Routledge.
Sarkar, S. [2008]: ‘ANote on FrequencyDependence and the Levels/Units of Selection’,
Biology and Philosophy 23: pp. 217–28.
Sober, E. [1984]: ąe Nature of Selection, Chicago IL: Chicago University Press.
Sober, E. [2011]: ‘A Priori Causal Models of Natural Selection’, Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 89: pp. 571–589.
32
Sober, E. andD. S.Wilson [1998]: UntoOthers: ąeEvolution andPsychology ofUnselĖsh
Behavior, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Sterelny, K. [1996]: ‘ăe Return of the Group’, Philosophy of Science 63: pp. 562–584.
van Fraassen, B. C. [1977]: ‘ăe Pragmatics of Explanation’, American Philosophical
Quarterly 14: pp. 143–150.
Woodward, J. [2003]: Makingąings Happen: Aąeory of Causal Explanation, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
33
